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Abstract 
Environmental variability and adaptive foraging behavior have been shown to favor 
coexistence of specialists and generalists on an ecological time scale. This leaves 
unaddressed the question whether such coexistence can also be expected on an 
evolutionary time scale. In this article we study the attainability, through gradual 
evolution, of specialist-generalist coexistence, as well as the evolutionary stability of 
such communities when allowing for immigration. Our analysis shows that the potential 
for specialist-generalist coexistence is much more restricted than originally thought, and 
strongly depends on the trade-off structure assumed. We establish that ecological 
coexistence is less likely for species facing a trade-off between per capita reproduction 
in different habitats than when the trade-off acts on carrying capacities alone. We also 
demonstrate that coexistence is evolutionarily stable whenever it is ecologically stable, 
but that in most cases such coexistence cannot be reached through gradual evolution. 
We conclude that an evolutionarily stable community of specialists and generalists may 
only be created through immigration from elsewhere or through mutations of large 
effect. Our results highlight that trade-offs in fitness-determining traits can have 
counterintuitive effects on the evolution of specialization. 
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Evolution Restricts the Coexistence of Specialists and 
Generalists – the Role of Trade-off Structure 
Martijn Egas 
Ulf Dieckmann 
Maurice W. Sabelis 
Introduction 
One of the major challenges in ecology and evolutionary biology is to achieve a better 
link between evolutionary and ecological dynamics. Do fast selection responses add 
new properties to ecosystem dynamics? And, perhaps more importantly, does ecological 
feedback affect selection pressures in unexpected ways? The various ways through 
which evolutionary and ecological dynamics interact are only beginning to be explored. 
For example, including natural selection in metapopulation models can lead to 
predictions of selection-driven metapopulation extinction (Gyllenberg et al. 2002; 
Parvinen 2002, Parvinen et al. 2003). Also, ecological feedback is increasingly viewed 
as a widespread source of frequency-dependent selection that may favor sympatric 
speciation through selection for assortative mating (Dieckmann and Doebeli 1999; 
Doebeli and Dieckmann 2000, 2003; Geritz and Kisdi 2000). 
A topic where such questions are particularly pertinent is species coexistence. Here 
the aim is to pinpoint conditions under which n species can live together on less than n 
resources, violating the principle of competitive exclusion (Hardin 1960). On the one 
hand, the ecological dynamics are well explored (e.g., Hutchinson 1961; Stewart and 
Levin 1973; Koch 1974; Armstrong and McGehee 1976a; Levins 1979; Chesson and 
Warner 1981; Abrams 1984; Chesson 1985; Brown 1989; Huisman and Weissing 1999; 
Anderlies and Beisner 2000; Richards et al. 2000; Wilson and Richards 2000; review in 
Chesson 2000), and the evolutionary dynamics of coexisting species have been well 
studied in the context of ecological character displacement (e.g., MacArthur and Levins 
1967; Roughgarden 1972; May and MacArthur 1972; Slatkin 1980; Case 1981; Taper 
and Case 1985, 1992a,b; Drossel and McKane 1999, 2000; Abrams and Chen 2002). On 
the other hand, we do not know whether natural selection with ecological feedback will 
restrict or broaden conditions for species coexistence. 
Questions concerning species coexistence have been related to specialization in 
resource utilization (e.g., Kotler and Brown 1988; Wilson and Yoshimura 1994; 
McPeek 1996; Morris 1996). Wilson and Yoshimura (1994) studied the ecological 
coexistence of one generalist and two specialists on two resources. They concluded that 
such coexistence is likely, assuming some degree of optimal foraging and 
environmental variability. However, evolutionary change in the strategies of specialists 
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and generalists was not considered, leaving open the question whether such coexistence 
may occur or persist at an evolutionary time scale. Specifically, evolution may restrict 
conditions for coexistence of specialists and generalists for two reasons. First, the 
coexistence of two specialists and a generalist may not be evolutionarily stable, 
implying that evolution would change their degree of specialization which may even 
lead to extinction of one or more species. Second, such coexistence may not be 
evolutionarily attainable, implying that the trimorphic state cannot be reached through 
gradual evolution. To what extent these factors restrict species coexistence is the topic 
of this article. 
Model description 
This section extends the model by Wilson and Yoshimura (1994) and explains how to 
analyze the evolutionary attainability and stability of community states involving both 
generalists and specialists. 
Population dynamics 
We consider the population dynamics of up to three species in two habitats, described 
by the following discrete-time Ricker equations, 
 
2
1 , 2 , 3 ,
, 1 ,
1
exp 1 j t j t j ti t ij t
j ij j
N N N
N N r
e K+ =
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ + ⎟⎜⎢ ⎥⎟⎜= − ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎟⎜ ⋅⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ . (1) 
Here, the basic reproduction ratios of populations in each habitat are described by an 
exponential function, where r is the intrinsic growth rate (assumed to be equal for all 
species), Nij,t is the abundance of species i in habitat j at time t, Kj is the carrying 
capacity  of a species in habitat j when maximally specialized on that habitat, and eij is 
the level of specialization, or relative efficiency, of species i in habitat j. Throughout 
this paper we focus on symmetric habitats, K1 = K2.  
Temporal variability among generations is introduced by randomly varying the 
values of K1 and K2 symmetrically around their mean, according to a uniform 
distribution. The relative variation vj for habitat j is defined by (Kj,max – Kj,min)/Kj. Both 
carrying capacities are varied independently among generations. 
Foraging rules 
Complementing the dynamics described by eq. (1), at the start of each generation 
individuals are redistributed over the two habitats based on their ideal free distribution 
(IFD; Fretwell and Lucas 1970). For the three species studied here, the IFD cannot be 
obtained analytically and thus has to be derived numerically. Departures from the IFD, 
which itself is biologically unrealistic, are considered as follows. Wilson and 
Yoshimura (1994) distributed a fraction g according to the IFD while the remaining 
fraction 1 – g was distributed randomly, i.e., with a probability Ki/(K1+K2) of entering 
habitat i. The fraction g allowed for the distribution of a consumer population over the 
two habitats to be continuously varied between fully optimal (g = 1) and completely 
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random (g = 0). This rule, however, results in discontinuous foraging behavior: the 
proportion foragers in a habitat exhibits large jumps even if efficiencies are being varied 
only gradually. To avoid such unrealistic foraging behavior we consider an alternative, 
continuous, foraging rule, assuming that foragers necessarily make some foraging errors 
relative to the IFD. In reality such errors will be more pronounced when the foragers 
experience a smaller fitness difference f2 – f1 (defined below) between the two habitats. 
According to this rule the probability p1 of using habitat 1 is 
 1
2 1
1
1 exp[ ( )]p a f f= + − , (2) 
where the parameter a determines the foraging accuracy. By varying a in the range 
[0, +∞), we can vary the distribution of consumers from random to IFD (figure 1a). 
When there is no fitness difference, foragers are randomly distributed over the two 
habitats. For a > 0, an increasing fitness difference results in an increasing proportion of 
foragers entering the habitat they are best adapted to. 
Trade-off structure 
Specialization on one habitat is assumed to go at the expense of specialization on 
another. Extreme specialists have efficiency 1 in one habitat and efficiency 0 in the 
other habitat, whereas generalists have intermediate efficiencies in both habitats. The 
trade-off constraining the levels of specialization on the two habitats is given by 
 
1/ 1/
1 2( ) ( ) 1s si ie e+ = . (3) 
The strength of the trade-off is determined by the parameter s (figure 1b): the trade-off 
is called weak when s < 1 (convex relation between ei1 and ei2) and strong when s > 1 
(concave relation between ei1 and ei2). 
In addition to varying the trade-off’s strength, different impacts of the trade-off can 
be considered. Individual-based derivations of the (population-level) Ricker model 
show how r and K depend on more mechanistic parameters. All these derivations agree 
in three conclusions: (i) r and K are not independent, (ii) they are linearly related, and 
(iii) K depends on mechanistic parameters not affecting r (Royama 1992; Dieckmann 
and Law 2000; Van Dooren 2000; Sumpter and Broomhead 2001). Two examples are 
r = ln[ρ/(1 − 1/n)], K = ln[ρ/(1 − 1/n)] / (−ln[(1 − 1/n)]), where ρ is the density-
independent per capita reproduction, and n is the population’s maximal size (Sumpter 
and Broomhead 2001), and r = γ, K = γ / s(1 − k), where γ is again density-independent 
per capita reproduction, s is the neighborhood area of one individual and k measures 
competition intensity (Royama 1992).  
These dependences of the population-level parameters r and K on individual-based 
traits have implications for the trade-off structures considered in our model. When 
individual traits determining density-independent reproduction (i.e., ρ or γ) in the two 
habitats trade off, this results - at the population level - in a trade-off affecting both r 
and K equally. A trade-off in K alone (i.e., a trade-off between K1 and K2 for habitats 1 
and 2 respectively), is also possible, because K depends on parameters that do not affect  
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Figure 1 Functions used for specifying foraging behavior and trade-offs. (a) Continuous foraging rule 
(eq. 2) for various values of foraging accuracy a. The case a = 0 corresponds to random foraging. (b) 
Trade-off function (eq. 3) for different values of the trade-off strength s. Trade-offs are called strong for 
s > 1, and weak for s < 1. 
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r. This trade-off structure occurs when individual traits that determine the maximum 
population size in the two habitats trade off (see eq. 1). By contrast, assuming a trade-
off in r alone (i.e., a trade-off between r1 and r2 for habitats 1 and 2 respectively) is 
impossible, because any parameter affecting r will likewise affect K. 
Thus, we analyze two alternative trade-off structures: a trade-off in K as described by 
eq. (1), and a trade-off in both K and r as described in the following equation, 
 
2
1 , 2 , 3 ,
, 1 ,
1
exp j t j t j ti t ij t ij
j j
N N N
N N r e
K+ =
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞+ + ⎟⎜⎢ ⎥⎟⎜= − ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎟⎜⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ . (4) 
Notice that in eq. (4) both r and Kj are multiplied with eij, whereas in eq. (1) this 
multiplication is applied to Kj only. 
Evolutionary analysis 
For the evolutionary analysis, we use the framework of adaptive dynamics (Metz et al. 
1996; Dieckmann and Law 1996; Dieckmann 1997; Geritz et al. 1998). One of the 
advantages of this approach is that it provides tools for analyzing conditions for the 
build-up of polymorphisms through gradual evolution. 
Such build-up is related to processes of evolutionary branching, through which a 
population under frequency-dependent selection evolves toward a fitness minimum. 
Under the resulting regime of disruptive selection, phenotypically similar species 
straddling the fitness minimum, when they occur, are predicted to diverge. Applying 
such analysis of frequency-dependent selection regimes sequentially yields the 
conditions for evolutionarily attainable coexistence, as illustrated below. In a population 
with only a single species, evolution may initially converge on the generalist strategy 
(figure 2a), even though this strategy may not be evolutionarily stable under all 
conditions. If evolutionary branching can occur in that situation, two very similar 
generalist species will be able to coexist around the branching point; these generalists 
will gradually diverge by specializing on one of the two habitats (figure 2b). 
Subsequently, these two species may end up at an evolutionary attractor that allows for 
secondary evolutionary branching, potentially resulting in two extreme specialists and 
two more generalist species (figure 2c). The two generalist species may then converge 
towards each other, to the extent that one of them may go extinct, leaving the other 
generalist in a state of evolutionarily stable coexistence with the two specialist species 
(figure 2d). Whereas evolutionary branching points will lead to the adaptive radiation of 
asexual morphs, the evolutionary processes that allow sexual species to differentiate 
have been investigated elsewhere (Dieckmann and Doebeli 1999; Doebeli and 
Dieckmann 2000, 2003; Geritz and Kisdi 2000; Matessi et al. 2001). Such extension to 
sexual species is beyond the scope of this article. 
Complementing the analysis of evolutionary attainability, we analyze the 
evolutionary stability of specialist-generalist coexistence in two steps: first, we delineate 
the conditions required for the generalist to invade a community of two extreme 
specialists (e.g., through immigration), and second, we check whether the ensuing 
gradual evolutionary change results in the extinction of one or more of the three species. 
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Figure 2  Sketch of the potential pathway by which coexistence of two specialists and one generalist 
species may be established through gradual evolution. (a) Evolution converges to the generalist strategy. 
(b) Primary evolutionary branching may allow for the coexistence of two similar generalist species, which 
subsequently diverge. The white circle atop the branching point indicates that we explicitly do not deal 
with the detailed genetic processes through which the two species might emerge. Secondary evolutionary 
branching may produce four species, all of which may coexist (c) or two of which may converge to the 
generalist strategy whereby one goes extinct (d). Our results ascertain the specific ecological settings for 
which outcomes (a), (b), and (d) occur in our model, whereas option (c), coexistence of four species, is 
shown to occur in our model only as a transient phenomenon. 
 
The evolutionary analyses described above are based on evaluating the invasion 
fitness of rare phenotypes, defined as their long-term per capita growth rate in a 
population dominated by a given resident strategy (Metz et al. 1992). In this way, the 
residents determine the environment in which the rare phenotype under consideration 
either succeeds or fails. If the rare phenotype can grow in the resident population, its 
invasion fitness is positive, whereas mutants that are deleterious in the resident’s 
environment have negative invasion fitness. To calculate invasion fitness in the above 
model, we numerically analyze the population dynamics of rare phenotypes: after 
sampling for 50,000 generations, a rare phenotype’s invasion fitness is calculated as the 
logarithm of the geometric average of its reproduction ratio over all generations. 
We use pairwise invasibility plots (PIPs) to show the sign structure of invasion 
fitness for different combinations of common and rare phenotypes (Matsuda 1985; Van 
Tienderen and De Jong 1986; Geritz et al. 1998; see also figure 3 for examples). In such 
plots, each point represents a combination (pair) of considered rare and common trait 
values (commonly called mutant and resident trait values, respectively) and gives the 
sign of the rare phenotype’s invasion fitness. Hence, a PIP shows areas of positive and 
negative invasion fitness. Along the plot’s main diagonal (where the two considered 
trait values equal each other) invasion fitness is necessarily zero; usually there is at least 
one other contour line of zero invasion fitness. Where this line intersects the main 
diagonal, an evolutionarily singular point is located, corresponding to an equilibrium of 
the considered evolutionary dynamics. Whether gradual evolution leads towards such a 
point or away from it is easily determined from the PIP (Geritz et al. 1998): for instance, 
if we start left of the singular point and invasion fitness above the diagonal is positive, 
phenotypes with a value closer to that of the singular point can invade and replace the 
resident phenotype. Also the evolutionary stability of singular points is readily  
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Figure 3  Representative gallery of pairwise invasibility plots (PIPs) for the case when the trade-off acts 
on K only. The effects of varying trade-off strength s (horizontal), foraging accuracy a (vertical), and 
temporal variability v (stacked) thus become visible. White areas indicate positive invasion fitness, grey 
areas negative. Other parameters: r = 1.3 and K1 = K2 = 100.  
 
established from the PIP (Geritz et al. 1998) by checking whether the vertical line 
through the singular point lies within an area of negative invasion fitness (no 
phenotypes can invade the singular one) or positive invasion fitness (phenotypes on 
both sides can invade a resident population with the singular phenotype). In the latter 
case, the singular phenotype is an evolutionary branching point: phenotypes narrowly 
straddling this point can then invade each other, allowing them to coexist (Geritz et al. 
1998). 
Coexistence in the absence of evolution 
In this section we analyze the potential for coexistence of specialists and generalists on 
an ecological time scale, based on the continuous foraging rule and considering the two 
alternative trade-off structures identified above. That is, we chart the parameter ranges 
for foraging accuracy, a, and trade-off strength, s, in which the extreme specialists can 
invade a population of generalists and, vice versa, the generalist can invade the 
community of two extreme specialists. The overlap between these two ranges 
characterizes the conditions for the ecological coexistence of specialists and generalists 
in a protected polymorphism. 
It turns out that the potential for ecological coexistence strongly depends on the 
assumed trade-off structure. With the trade-off in K only, such coexistence is possible 
under a wide range of conditions (figure 4a). The extreme specialists are always able to 
invade a population of generalists, and, at least under weak trade-offs, the generalist can  
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Figure 4  Conditions for ecological and evolutionary coexistence of specialists and generalists, with the 
trade-off in K only (left column) or in both K and r (right column). (a-b) Critical combinations of foraging 
accuracy a and trade-off strength s for the generalist to invade the community of two extreme specialists 
and vice versa. Coexistence of specialists and generalists is possible in the mutual invasibility areas (to 
the right and above the curves indicating various levels of temporal variability: v = 0.6, v = 1.0, v = 1.4, 
v = 1.8). Note that the extreme specialists can always invade the generalist population in panel a (as 
explained in the text). (c-d) Critical combinations of foraging accuracy a and trade-off strength s to result 
in specialization through evolutionary branching or, alternatively, in a continuously stable generalist 
strategy (CSS). (c) Thick curve: no variability (v = 0); curves below, from top to bottom v = 0.2, v = 0.6, 
v = 1.0, v = 1.4, v = 1.8. (d) Thick curve: no variability (v = 0); other curves, from top to bottom v = 1.8, 
v = 1.4, v = 1.0, v = 0.6, v = 0.2. (e-f) Critical combinations of foraging accuracy a and trade-off strength s 
for the existence of an interior pair of specialist singular strategies that are branching points (above the 
curves), leading to secondary branching and hence to the coexistence of specialists and generalists 
through gradual evolution. The thick curves delineating the grey areas indicate, according to panels (c-d), 
where primary evolutionary branching cannot happen in the absence of temporal variability. Other 
parameter values as in figure 3.  
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also invade the community of specialists, provided the temporal variability in the 
environment is sufficiently high (v1 = v2 ≥ 0.2). In contrast, with the trade-off in both K 
and r, the potential for coexistence is much more restricted (figure 4b). Specifically, 
there are many settings (roughly, whenever foraging accuracy is below 1) in which the 
specialists cannot invade a population of generalists. 
The reason for this difference lies in the way trade-offs involving carrying capacities 
and growth rates translate into trade-offs in fitness. With the trade-off in K only, fitness 
approaches minus infinity for an extreme specialist in the habitat it is not adapted to, 
because a carrying capacity approaching zero means instant death. Accordingly, K 
appears in the denominator of fitness (see Appendix). Hence, for any degree of foraging 
accuracy, an extreme specialist will always choose to live in the habitat it is adapted to. 
Because the generalist has a lower carrying capacity for that habitat, the invading 
extreme specialist will always attain a positive growth rate. With the trade-off in both K 
and r (i.e., between reproduction ratios in the two habitats) fitness does not reduce so 
drastically for an extreme specialist in the unfavorable habitat (see Appendix). This 
results in a wide range of settings in which an extreme specialist cannot invade a 
population of generalists because (given the strength of the trade-off) the specialist 
cannot forage accurately enough for the habitat it is specialized on. This large difference 
in coexistence between the two trade-off structures remains when we consider less 
extreme specialists, which never experience a fitness of minus infinity: even with an 
efficiency of 0.1 in one habitat (instead of 0), a specialist still has such a low fitness in 
that habitat that, through its foraging behavior, it concentrates completely on the habitat 
it is adapted to.  
In their analysis, Wilson and Yoshimura (1994) considered a trade-off in K only. 
They found coexistence of specialists and generalists even (a) for moderately low 
variation in carrying capacities, (b) for a wide range of efficiency of the generalist 
(between 0.99 and 0.4, when variability is high), and (c) for moderate departures from 
optimal foraging (g ≥ 0.75, i.e., up to a quarter of the individuals distributed randomly 
across habitats). Our findings for a trade-off in K only (figure 4a) agree with these 
earlier results. We can thus conclude that, while the choice of foraging rule 
(discontinuous or continuous) is immaterial for the ecological coexistence of specialists 
and generalists, the assumed trade-off structure has a dramatic impact on the potential 
for ecological coexistence. 
Coexistence under gradual evolution 
In this section we analyze the effects of temporal variability and foraging accuracy on 
the evolution of specialization, thus establishing how the coexistence of specialists and 
generalists can come about through gradual evolution. We start by examining the 
baseline case with random foraging and without temporal variation. Taking advantage 
of the resulting overview regarding the impact of the trade-off structure, we then 
explore the effects of non-random foraging and temporal variability. 
As we explained above, the discontinuous foraging rule suggested by Wilson and 
Yoshimura (1994) involves an unrealistic jump in foraging behavior: phenotypes 
arbitrarily close to the resident phenotype are assumed to detect the diminutive 
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differentials in their relative fitness unfailingly and to select their habitat accordingly. 
As long as the considered phenotypes are kept sufficiently apart, this shortcoming is not 
critical. Gradual evolution, however, is driven by competition between similar 
phenotypes and thus turns out to be structurally unstable when the discontinuous 
foraging rule is applied (results not shown). Since biologically meaningful conclusions 
must never be based on structurally unstable models, we only use the continuous 
foraging rule for the evolutionary analyses below.  
The crucial importance of trade-off structure for the evolution of 
specialization 
As a starting point for the evolutionary analysis, we consider the baseline case without 
temporal variability (v1 = v2 = 0) and with random foraging (a = 0). Under these 
conditions, the model has a one-dimensional feedback loop (through total population 
size), which implies that evolution is optimizing (Mylius and Dieckmann 1995; 
Meszéna et al. 2001; Meszéna and Metz 2003). 
When the trade-off acts on K only, even the baseline case offers some surprises. For 
rather weak trade-offs (s < s1 < 1), evolution converges to the generalist strategy (figure 
3, bottom left). This is just what would be expected from classical theory (e.g., Levins 
1962, 1968; Lawlor and Maynard Smith 1976). However, for moderately weak or 
moderately strong trade-offs (s1 < s < s2) the system becomes evolutionarily tristable 
(figure 3, bottom middle): depending on the initial phenotype, the population evolves 
either to full specialization on either habitat or to full generalization. When the trade-off 
is strengthened well beyond the linear case (1 < s2 < s), the tristability disappears, giving 
way to the traditionally expected bistability: there is now always selection for increased 
specialization on the habitat the initial phenotype is best adapted to (figure 3, bottom 
right), which is in line with classical theory again. 
The pattern summarized above is based on a pitchfork bifurcation occurring at s = s2: 
when the trade-off strength is lowered beyond that threshold, the generalist repeller 
(figure 3, bottom right) is replaced by a generalist attractor surrounded by two repellers 
(figure 3, bottom middle). As s is further decreased, these new repellers move apart, 
until they collide, at s = s1, with the boundaries of trait space. For trade-offs weaker than 
the latter threshold, only the generalist attractor remains (figure 3, bottom left). (When 
habitats are asymmetric, K1 ≠  K2, the pitchfork bifurcation at s = s2 is replaced by a 
fold bifurcation, and the two evolutionary repellers collide with the boundaries of trait 
space at two different trade-off strengths, s = s10, s11.) In a further departure from 
classical theory, the thresholds for the strength of the trade-off at which the described 
transitions occur depend on the value of the intrinsic growth rate r. In particular, the 
generalist strategy is always selected against, and hence tristability gives way to 
bistability, when s > s2 = 1/(r – 1) (see Appendix).  
When the trade-off is in both K and r, results are more similar to the classical theory 
in that there are only two evolutionary regimes: for this trade-off structure, we have not 
found any tristability. Evolution converges to the generalist when r < (1/s − 1)2s (see 
Appendix). To satisfy this condition for positive r, s must be smaller than 1, s < s3 < 1. 
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Notice, however, that in contrast to classical theory a moderately weak trade-off, 
s3 < s < 1, will still select for full specialization. Also, the evolutionary outcome again 
depends on the growth rate r. 
Effects of temporal variability and foraging behavior on the evolution of 
specialization 
We now move to the general case, first considering foraging behavior and then temporal 
variability as well. The analysis follows the outline in figure 2. 
Our investigations show that the only attracting singular point of single-species 
evolution is the generalist strategy. It is therefore only at this point that gradual 
evolution can transform the single-species community into a two-species community. If 
a resident population of generalists cannot be invaded by nearby strategies, the 
generalist strategy is continuously stable (a CSS; Eshel 1983; see figure 3 bottom left); 
if, instead, such invasion is possible, the generalist strategy is an evolutionary branching 
point (an EBP; see figure 3 top row). Investigating the evolutionary stability of the 
generalist strategy with foraging behavior but without temporal variability, we find that 
for both trade-off structures the generalist strategy changes from a CSS to an EBP when 
foraging accuracy is increased beyond a threshold (figure 4c,d; note that each point in 
these panels corresponds to a PIP as shown in figure 3). When the trade-off acts only on 
K, there is – for each value of the intrinsic growth rate r – a linear relationship between 
the foraging accuracy and the strength of the trade-off for which the CSS-EBP transition 
takes place (see Appendix). Also when the trade-off acts on both K and r, such a 
relationship exist, but for this trade-off structure the relation is nonlinear (see 
Appendix). 
Our numerical results show that the boundary of generalist evolutionary stability is 
only slightly affected by considering different levels of temporal variability in the 
carrying capacities (v1 = v2 ranging from 0.2 to 1.8). Therefore, up to this stage in the 
analysis, temporal variability hardly affects the evolutionary outcome (see, e.g., figure 
3). However, again there is a remarkable difference between the two trade-off structures 
(figure 4c,d). When the trade-off is in both K and r, higher temporal variability slightly 
increases the critical foraging accuracy (figure 4d). This is what we expected, based on 
the traditional notion that higher variability favors the generalist. By contrast, with the 
trade-off in K only, the reverse is true: higher temporal variability causes the 
generalist’s evolutionary stability to be lost already at a lower foraging accuracy (figure 
4c). 
For the parameter values that allow for evolutionary branching in a single-species 
community, we numerically analyzed gradual evolution in the resulting two-species 
community. For the resulting evolutionary attractors, we again assessed whether 
evolutionary branching can occur, As explained above, such secondary evolutionary 
branching could transform the two-species community into a four-species community 
(figure 2c,d). In absence of temporal variability, evolution always leads to two extreme 
specialists – transitions to higher degrees of polymorphism are then precluded (figure 
4e,f). With temporal variability, the outcome of gradual two-species evolution is also 
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often a pair of extreme specialists. Only when temporal variability is high and foraging 
accuracy is very high, we find singular points of two-species evolution inside the trait 
space of our model; these points always are secondary branching points (figure 4e,f). 
For the parameter values that allow for secondary evolutionary branching, we 
numerically analyzed gradual evolution in the resulting four-species community. For the 
parameter space considered in figure 4, these four-species communities always 
collapsed to three-species communities involving two extreme specialists and one 
generalist, as sketched in figure 2d. That is to say, two of the four species evolved 
towards extreme specialization, and the other two species evolved towards the generalist 
strategy whereby one of the latter went extinct. 
In summary, gradual evolution in this model can result in coexistence of specialists 
and generalists, but only for consumers whose foraging accuracy is very high and who 
live in an environment affected by strong temporal variability. In this limited parameter 
range, even when one or several species accidentally go extinct, evolution is predicted 
to reconstitute the coexistence of specialists and generalist. 
Coexistence under gradual evolution after generalist 
immigration 
Finally, we investigate the evolutionary stability of ecologically stable three-species 
communities. Evolutionarily stability of the community of specialists and generalist is 
already ensured in the parameter region where we predict secondary evolutionary 
branching. However, the region of parameter space where the generalist can invade a 
community of two extreme specialists is larger. It is quite possible that the generalist, 
after invading, is also able to stably coexist with the two extreme specialists on an 
evolutionary time scale. One possibility for such an invasion scenario is that a generalist 
phenotype is created through a mutation with large effect. However, genes of large 
effect leading to viable phenotypes do not commonly occur (for an exception, see De 
Jong et al. 2000). A more likely possibility therefore is invasion of a generalist into the 
two-specialist community by immigration from another geographic location. 
For the parameter region where the generalist can invade a community of two 
extreme specialists (figure 4a,b), we numerically assessed whether this invasion leads to 
selection on the specialists to become generalist. We find that, over the entire parameter 
space considered, invasion of the generalist always results in stronger divergent 
selection on the specialists (which must remain inconsequential since the specialists are 
already maximally specialized). Hence, the three-species community is indeed always 
evolutionarily stable once created through invasion of the generalist. 
We can thus conclude that, after immigration, the stable coexistence of specialists 
and generalist can be attained under a wider range of ecological settings than with 
gradual evolution alone (compare figure 4a,b with 4e,f) – allowing for community 
construction through migration relaxes the conditions for stable coexistence. Note that 
the extra parameter region allowing for coexistence is small when the trade-off acts on 
both K and r (compare figure 4b with 4f) because ecological coexistence is already 
restricted in this case, but it is much larger when the trade-off acts on K only (compare 
figure 4a with 4e) because in that case ecological coexistence is widely possible. 
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Discussion 
In this article, we have shown that the potential for coexistence between specialists and 
generalists crucially depends on the specific trade-off structure assumed (figure 4). 
Ecological coexistence is much more feasible with the trade-off in K only than with the 
trade-off in K and r. However, under gradual evolution without immigration, conditions 
for the establishment of specialist-generalist coexistence become equally restricted. 
Specifically, coexistence of two specialists and one generalist is only attainable through 
gradual evolution if foraging accuracy is very high and if temporal variability is strong. 
When the generalist can invade a community of two specialists through immigration (or 
through a mutation of large effect), conditions for the evolutionarily stable coexistence 
of specialists and generalists are less restricted when the trade-off acts on K only, but 
not when the trade-off acts on both K and r. Considerable environmental variation still 
remains necessary. Overall, specialist-generalist coexistence turns out to be less likely 
than a purely ecological analysis (Wilson and Yoshimura 1994) had previously 
suggested. 
Limitations of our study 
This article is based on a relatively simple model; three of the simplifications we had to 
make are scrutinized below. First, we have not explicitly modeled the dynamics of 
resources determining the carrying capacities in the two considered habitats. This is not 
critical as long as resource dynamics occur on a shorter time scale than consumer 
dynamics; resources can then be assumed to be in a quasi-steady state depending on 
consumer abundances. Since the discrete-time population dynamics investigated here 
would often operate on an annual basis, within-season equilibration of resources may 
indeed be likely. However, including resource dynamics may sometimes result in non-
equilibrium dynamics, creating internally driven temporal variability for the consumer. 
This could have interesting ecological and evolutionary implications, as discussed in the 
next section. 
Second, one may prefer to investigate trade-offs between ecological parameters that 
are more mechanistic than the intrinsic growth rates and carrying capacities considered 
in this study. A wide range of specific studies will then be required. Although the 
Ricker model can be derived from individual-based descriptions, it will often be 
difficult to decide on the specific trait(s) traded off between habitats. As shown by 
Matessi and Gatto (1984), descriptions of r and K can be derived from resource-
consumer models using the quasi-steady state assumption. For example, there could be a 
trade-off between attack rates on one resource and the other (or between conversion 
efficiencies of resource biomass into consumer biomass): Matessi and Gatto (1984) 
show that this results in a trade-off acting on both K and r, just as described in eq. (4). 
They also find, for various model formulations, that K is linearly related to r, again as 
described in eq. (4).  
Third, we have assumed that consumers can partially attain an ideal free distribution 
(limited by their foraging accuracy), without modeling the dynamics of foraging 
behavior in detail. If foraging behavior occurs at the same time scale as population 
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dynamics, complex dynamics may result (Abrams 1999). However, the Ricker model 
assumes discrete time steps, whereas foraging behavior normally takes place on a much 
shorter time scale. Alternatively, consumers may use various other foraging strategies, 
such as fixed preference, and ideal free foragers then do not necessarily perform best 
(e.g., Fryxell 1997, Richards and De Roos 2001). Specialists and generalists may differ 
in the foraging strategy they adopt. It is presently unclear how such a suite of different 
foraging strategies would affect coexistence. 
Challenges for future study 
Our results have revealed surprising effects of the trade-off structure on the evolution of 
specialization, emphasizing two points. First, theoretical predictions based on a trade-
off in fitness (e.g., Levins 1962, 1968) do not easily carry over to models (or, for that 
matter, experimental systems) where such a trade-off is assumed in a fitness component 
such as carrying capacity. Recently, Rueffler et al. (2003) have extended Levins’ (1962, 
1968) ‘fitness set’ approach to include frequency-dependent selection, presenting a 
framework which can deal with all possible types of trade-offs. Their results show that 
the way the trade-offs enter the fitness function (i.e., which components of fitness are 
really traded off) crucially determines the evolutionary dynamics and predictions – 
including selection for specialists under a weak trade-off, or selection for generalists 
under a strong trade-off. Second, we have shown that models (or, again, experimental 
systems) with trade-offs in one or several fitness components that do not linearly 
translate into a fitness trade-off can yield more complex predictions for the evolution of 
specialization than previously thought, including evolutionary tristability. Since it is 
generally very difficult to measure the fitness of individuals in experimental systems, 
evolutionary biologists usually restrict their experiments to measuring one or several 
components of fitness. For instance, in insect-plant biology these are oviposition rate, 
juvenile mortality rate, juvenile body mass increase or rate of development (i.e., traits 
affecting per capita reproduction rate; see, e.g., Futuyma and Moreno 1988; Jaenike 
1990) – but typically never the maximum number of individuals a habitat can sustain 
(i.e., carrying capacity). 
It is an interesting open question to assess which additional assumptions are needed 
to cause the loss of evolutionary robustness of three-species communities comprising of 
two specialists and one generalist. One such scenario is that the two specialist species 
are selected to become less specialized, to a degree where they “squeeze out” the 
generalist species. We suggest that separate trade-offs for both per capita reproduction 
and maximum population size – and thus more complex trade-offs in r and K than we 
considered – might be necessarily and sufficient. Such trade-offs will translate into 
more complex fitness gradients which might lead to a situation where invasion of a 
generalist species may actually result in evolution of the specialists towards 
generalization, and the eventual extinction of the generalist. Another scenario is that the 
two specialist species are selected to become increasingly specialized, to a degree where 
they are outcompeted by the generalist species. This scenario seems to be more likely, 
since the effect of the generalist species is to dampen the variation in growth rate of the 
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specialists (by occupying a habitat in higher numbers if it is relatively empty and the 
other habitat is relatively full). This dampening effect favors increased specialization in 
our model, but does not lead to extinction. In a fully stochastic individual-based model, 
extinction may occur over a wider area of parameter space than in our current model 
(where population growth is deterministic). For instance, the generalist species may 
force the two specialist species to forage only in the habitat they are specialized on. If 
the density of a specialist species is low, and carrying capacity is low for several 
generations, this species may readily go extinct. When, in addition, coexistence can be 
restored relatively easily through the immigration of specialist and generalist species, 
our model predicts continuous change in both the number of species and the degree of 
specialization in the system over time – due to a complex interplay of ecological and 
evolutionary dynamics. 
Temporal variability in model systems can be internally driven (instead of externally 
imposed), when the dynamics consist of sustained cycles or deterministic chaos (May 
1973), which can also promote coexistence (Armstrong and McGehee 1976b, 1980; 
Adler 1990; Huisman and Weissing 1999). In the Ricker model for one population 
living on a single resource, unstable population dynamics ensue for high values of the 
intrinsic growth rate r (cycles for r > 2, chaos for r > 2.692; May 1975). Choosing r in 
our model such that the generalist species would have stable population dynamics, but a 
specialist species would undergo cycles (or maybe even show chaotic behavior), 
promises to yield complex evolutionary dynamics. A generalist species would then 
create a stable environment that may result in evolutionary branching leading to two 
specialized species. However, these would create an unstable environment which 
subsequently allows a generalist species to coexist, if it is able to immigrate or arise 
from the odd major-effect mutation. This leads to the same questions as discussed above 
with regard to the evolutionary robustness of specialist-generalist coexistence. Hence, 
studying the evolutionary dynamics of coexistence in systems with internally driven 
fluctuations promises to give intriguing and potentially counterintuitive new insights. 
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